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To Review or Not to Review: The Plain Truth About
Illinois' Plain Error Rule
Steven W. Becker*
"IT]he plain error doctrine bypasses normal forfeiture principles and
allows a reviewing court to consider unpreserved error when either (1)
the evidence is close, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2)
the error is serious, regardless of the closeness of the evidence."
- People v. Herron1
I. INTRODUCTION
On May 19, 2005, the Illinois Supreme Court issued two important
decisions, People v. Herron2 and People v. Durr.3  Both decisions
confirmed the court's adherence to Illinois' traditional plain error test
and defined the parameters of the rule's two prongs. Significantly, the
court also explicitly rejected the institutional agenda of the State's
Attorney's Office to abrogate Illinois' long-standing plain error test in
favor of the prosecution-friendly federal plain error test.4 In so doing,
the Illinois Supreme Court reaffirmed its role "as guardian[] of
constitutional rights and the integrity of the criminal justice system."5
A correct understanding of the plain error rule-and how it differs
from the federal rule-is essential because the question of the rule's
* Assistant Appellate Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, First District, Chicago,
Illinois; Adjunct Professor, DePaul University College of Law, Chicago, Illinois; Senior Fellow,
International Human Rights Law Institute, DePaul University College of Law; Co-Rrdacteur en
Chef, REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT Pl*NAL (France).
The author represented Floyd Durr in both the Illinois Appellate Court and Illinois Supreme
Court and orally argued Mr. Durr's case in front of both courts, advocating for the retention of
Illinois' plain error test. See People v. Floyd Durr, No. 1-01-1711 (Rule 23 Order) (1st Dist. June
25, 2003) (reversing convictions on three counts of predatory criminal sexual assault and one
count of aggravated kidnapping, and remanding for new trial), vacated for reconsideration, 796
N.E.2d 1062 (Ill. 2003) (supervisory order), after remand, No. 1-01-1711 (Rule 23 Order) (1st
Dist. Dec. 24, 2003) (vacating conviction and 20-year sentence on one count of predatory
criminal sexual assault but affirming remaining convictions), aff'd, 830 N.E.2d 527 (Il. 2005).
1. People v. Herron, 830 N.E.2d 467, 479 (Ill. 2005).
2. Id.
3. 830 N.E.2d 527, 527 (Ill. 2005).
4. Herron, 830 N.E.2d at 475-79.
5. People v. Blue, 724 N.E.2d 920, 941 (Il1. 2000).
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applicability arises in almost every criminal appeal in Illinois. It is a
rare case indeed in which the State does not assert that a defendant has
"waived" the right to raise an issue in front of the reviewing court on
account of defense counsel's failure to properly preserve the error in the
trial court for purposes of appeal. However, even among seasoned
practitioners, the doctrine of "plain error" remains an enigma.
6
Accordingly, the purpose of this Article is to clarify the plain error rule
as it is applied in Illinois practice and to highlight its important role in
ensuring the preservation of the integrity of the criminal appeal process
in Illinois.
Part II of this Article will provide a general overview of plain error,
7
discuss Illinois' plain error test as it developed historically,8 and explain
the federal plain error standard, which is substantively different from
Illinois' Vlain error formulation in that it incorporates a harmless error
analysis. Part II will also examine the Illinois Supreme Court's
reliance upon the federal plain error test in the context of alleged
Apprendi errors,10 catalog how these decisions led to confusion in the
appellate courts, 11 and document how the State seized upon this
confusion in an attempt to further its agenda to abrogate the Illinois rule
in favor of the federal test. 12 Part III will then describe the Herron and
Durr decisions with respect to their clarification of the scope of Illinois'
plain error rule. 13 Part IV will argue that, although the Illinois Supreme
6. The only previous scholarly work to attempt an in-depth exploration of the parameters of
Illinois' plain error rule was written twenty-five years ago. See Paul T. Wangerin, "Plain Error"
and "Fundamental Fairness": Toward a Definition of Exceptions to the Rules of Procedural
Default, 29 DEPAUL L. REV. 753 (1980) (describing an overall theory for defining previously
undefined exceptions to the general rule that criminal defendants are required to make timely
procedural motions and contemporaneous objections to pre-trial or trial errors to avoid losing the
right to raise those errors on appeal).
7. See infra Part II.A. I (defining the plain error doctrine and describing its application).
8. See infra Parts II.A.2-3 (tracing the history of the Illinois' plain error doctrine and its two-
prong test).
9. See infra Part II.B (describing the elements of the federal plain error t(st and the permissive
nature of its application).
10. See infra Part II.D.1 (demonstrating the Illinois Supreme Court's application of Apprendi
and the federal plain error test to Illinois decisions). See also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466, 498 (2000) (holding that any fact, other than a prior conviction, that increases the penalty for
a crime beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt).
11. See infra Part II.D.2 (detailing decisions that resulted in confusion among the Illinois
appellate courts as to the definition of plain error in Illinois).
12. See infra Part II.E (discussing the arguments of the State's Attorney's Office for
implementing the federal plain error rule in various cases and the Illinois Supreme Court's
rejection thereof).
13. See infra Part Im (outlining the Illinois Supreme Court's decisions in People v. Herron and
People v. Durr).
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Court reached the correct result in Herron by retaining Illinois' plain
error test, the court's reasoning was flawed because it attempted to
equate Illinois' plain error rule with the federal test. 14  This Part will
also analyze the Durr decision to reveal the important role that Illinois'
plain error rule plays in preserving a defendant's right to a fair trial.
15
II. BACKGROUND
In order to best appreciate the importance of the Illinois Supreme
Court's decisions in Herron and Durr, it is necessary to first understand
the history and operation of the plain error rule in Illinois. This Part
provides a brief introduction to the plain error rule in Illinois. It begins
by defining the rule and contrasting it with the harmless error rule. l1 It
then offers a brief history of the rule in Illinois and an examination of
the rule's two prongs. 17  Next, it describes the federal plain error test
and reveals important differences between the tests. 18 This Part finally
discusses how the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Crespo19 led to
confusion among the Illinois appellate courts regarding the proper
application of the rule,20  thus opening the door for the State's
Attorney's Office to argue for the total abrogation of the rule in
Illinois.
21
A. Illinois' Plain Error Rule
1. Plain Error and Harmless Error
The Illinois Supreme Court most recently defined plain error as "a
standard to help a reviewing court determine when to excuse
14. See infra Part IV.A (analyzing the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in People v. Herron
and discussing how it aids in the prevention of convicting innocent persons and safeguarding the
integrity of the criminal justice system).
15. See infra Part IV.B (analyzing the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in People v. Durr and
discussing the importance of maintaining the Illinois rule).
16. See infra Part lI.A. 1 (defining the plain error rule and its relationship to the harmless error
rule).
17. See infra Parts II.A.2-3 (explaining the evolution of the Illinois plain error rule and its
underlying principles).
18. See infra Parts I.B-C (examining and contrasting the federal plain error test with the rule
in Illinois).
19. See infra Part II.D.I (analyzing the incorporation of the federal plain error rule in Illinois
cases, including People v. Crespo).
20. See infra Part Il.D.2 (reviewing other Illinois cases referencing the federal plain error rule
following People v. Crespo).
21. See infra Part II.E (outlining efforts by the Illinois State's Attorney's Office to promote
judicial adoption of the federal plain error test).
2006] 457
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forfeiture." 22  In other words, plain error is "[t]he principle that an
appeals court can reverse a judgment because of an error in the
proceedings even if the error was not objected to at the time." 23 The
plain error doctrine has been generally described as encompassing those
errors "which are obvious, which affect the substantial rights of the
accused, and which, if uncorrected, would be an affront to the integrity
and reputation of judicial proceedings." 24
The application of the plain error rule arises in situations where the
defense fails to properly preserve an issue for appellate review.25  In
Illinois, "[b]oth a trial objection and a written post-trial motion raising
26the issue" are normally required to preserve issues for appeal. The
reason for these procedural requirements is to limit the scope of
appellate errors to those that are considered significant by the parties
and to ensure that the trial judge has the opportunity to correct such
errors at the trial court level. Those issues not properly preserved are
deemed forfeited.28
22. People v. Herron, 830 N.E.2d 467, 475 n. 1 (Ill. 2005).
23. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1035 (5th ed. 1979).
24. Id.
25. See People v. Thurow, 786 N.E.2d 1019, 1025 (Il. 2003) (noting that a plain error
analysis "applies where the defendant has failed to make a timely objection").
26. People v. Enoch, 522 N.E.2d 1124, 1130 (Ill. 1988). In Illinois, the requirement that
defense counsel specify the grounds for a new trial in a written motion is statutory in nature. See
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/116-1 (West 2004) (describing the process by which a defendant may be
granted a new trial; the defendant must file a written motion within thirty days, specify the
grounds for the new trial, and serve reasonable notice on the state).
27. People v. Caballero, 464 N.E.2d 223, 227, 231-32 (II1. 1984); see also Herron, 830
N.E.2d at 472-73 (II. 2005) ("The so-called waiver principle encourages the defendant to raise
issues before the trial court, allowing the court to correct its own errors before the instructions are
given, and consequently disallowing the defendant to obtain a reversal through inaction.").
28. In common practice, courts and practitioners often refer to the plain error rule as an
exception to the "waiver" doctrine. Yet, with respect to the general concept of "waiver," it should
be noted that courts often incorrectly use the terms "waiver," "forfeiture," and "procedural
default" interchangeably in criminal cases. People v. Blair, 831 N.E.2d 604, 615 (Il1. 2005). The
Illinois Supreme Court is no exception. See id. (collecting cases). These terms, however, are not
equivalent and have different technical meanings.
"Waiver" strictly means "the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right."
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). See Blair, 831 N.E.2d at 615 n.2 (distinguishing
waiver, forfeiture, and procedural default). "Forfeiture," on the other hand, is "the failure to
make the timely assertion of a right." United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993). Similar
to the latter term, the phrase "procedural default" relates to "a failure by counsel to comply with
certain procedural requirements," which failure "results in the forfeiture of the defendant's right
to raise that error on appeal." Blair, 831 N.E.2d at 615 n.2. Thus, certain rights may be forfeited
by means short of waiver like the right to a public trial, but others may not like the right to
counsel and the right to trial by jury. See Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 894 n.2 (1991)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (giving examples of those instances
where rights may be forfeited by means short of waiver and those where they may not).
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Because of these procedural requirements, the plain error doctrine
does not instruct a reviewing court to consider all forfeited errors. 29 As
such, it is not "a general saving clause preserving for review all errors
affecting substantial rights whether or not they have been brought to the
attention of the trial court." 30 Rather, plain error is a limited exception
to the forfeiture rule that "protect[s] the rights of the defendant and the
integrity and reputation of the judicial process." 3 1 In addition, although
plain error is not a constitutional doctrine, it "has roots in the same soil
as due process ' 32 in that its purpose is to ensure that a defendant "is not
denied his right to a fair and impartial ... trial."33
In contrast to the plain error rule, the harmless error rule applies
where the defendant makes a timely objection. 34 In general, "harmless
error" is "an error committed in the progress of the trial below...
which was not prejudicial to the rights of the party assigning it."35
"[T]he burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice" is on the State
under a harmless error analysis. 36 The test for a constitutional error iswhether the error was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." 37
2. Historical Overview of Illinois' Plain Error Rule
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(a) contains Illinois' harmless error
and plain error rules: "Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which
Thus, in applying the plain error rule in practice, litigants are most often addressing errors that
have been technically "forfeited" rather than "waived." Cf Blair, 831 N.E.2d at 615 (adopting
the term "forfeited" in its opinion to refer to issues that could have been raised, but were not, and
are therefore barred); People v. Free, 522 N.E.2d 1184, 1189-90 (I1. 1988) (Ryan, J., specially
concurring) (noting that the case involved procedural default rather than waiver); People v.
Corrie, 690 N.E.2d 128, 134-35 (111. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1998) (employing the term "forfeiture," as
opposed to "waiver," to analyze a sentencing issue where no post-sentencing motion was filed).
29. Herron, 830 N.E.2d at 474.
30. People v. Precup, 382 N.E.2d 227, 231 (I11. 978).
31. Herron, 830 N.E.2d at 474.
32. Id.
33. People v. Underwood, 378 N.E.2d 513, 516 (Ill. 1978).
34. People v. Thurow, 786 N.E.2d 1019, 1025 (111. 2003).
35. People v. Singer, 628 N.E.2d 592, 597 (IW1. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1993) (quoting People v.
Jenkins, 568 N.E.2d 122, 128 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1991)).
36. Thurow, 786 N.E.2d at 1025 (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993)).
37. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967), overruled in part on other grounds by
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993). The Illinois Supreme Court has identified three
approaches for measuring constitutional error pursuant to Chapman: (1) whether the error might
have contributed to the conviction; (2) whether the other evidence in the case overwhelmingly
supports a conviction; and (3) "whether the improperly admitted evidence is merely cumulative or
duplicates properly admitted evidence." People v. Patterson, No. 98641, 2005 Il. LEXIS 2069,
at *28-*29 (Dec. 15, 2005). See People v. Brown, 842 N.E.2d 1141, 1150 (I11. App. Ct. 2005)
(applying the Chapman test to confrontation clause errors and finding that errors were not
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).
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does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. Plain errors or
defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were
not brought to the attention of the trial court."38 The precise language of
the rule may be traced back to section 121-9(a) of the Illinois Code of
Criminal Procedure of 1963. 3 9  This provision was subsequently
repealed and superseded by Rule 615(a). Since its introduction into
the Supreme Court Rules in 1967, the wording of Rule 615(a) has
remained unchanged. 4'
It should also be noted that Illinois Supreme Court Rule 451(c),
which pertains to jury instructions in criminal cases, provides that
"substantial defects are not waived by failure to make timely objections
thereto if the interests of justice require."42 Rule 45 1(c) offers a remedy
for "grave errors," which parallels Rule 615(a)'s remedy for plain errors
generally. 43 Accordingly, courts construe Rule 451(c) and Rule 615(a)
identically.
44
3. Two Prongs of the Illinois Plain Error Rule
The Illinois Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the plain error
rule may be invoked to review alleged errors not properly preserved
when "(1) the evidence in a criminal case is closely balanced or (2) the
error is so fundamental and of such magnitude that the accused is
denied the right to a fair trial and remedying the error is necessary to
preserve the integrity of the judicial process." 45  Thus, a disjunctive
38. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 615(a).
39. See Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38 § 121-9(a) (West 1963) (stating that "any error, defect,
irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded [and] [p]lain
errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the
attention of the trial court").
40. See SMITH-HURD ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 §§ 115-1 to 1000, at 226, Hist. & Stat. Notes
(1990); Introductory Committee Comments, 36 I11. 2d 18, 24 (1967) (regarding criminal appeals
rules).
41. Cf ILL. SUP. CT. R. 615(a) (stating the same rule as stated in § 121-9(a) of the Illinois
Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963).
42. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 451(c). Rule 451(c) "is expressly addressed to the failure to make a
timely trial objection" to a jury instruction. People v. Keene, 660 N.E.2d 901, 916 (Ill. 1995).
Thus, where a defendant makes a timely objection to an instructional error at trial but fails to
include the issue in a post-trial motion, plain error review is available under Rule 615(a) instead.
See People v. Durr, 830 N.E.2d 527, 535 (Ill. 2005) (finding that even if no chance of excusing
the bar exists under Rule 451 (c), an avenue exists for plain error relief under Rule 615(a)).
43. People v. Armstrong, 700 N.E.2d 960, 969 n.3 (111. 1998).
44. People v. Herron, 830 N.E.2d 467, 473 (i1. 2005) ("Rule 451(c) is coextensive with the
'plain error' clause of Supreme Court Rule 615(a) .... ).
45. People v. Johnson, 803 N.E.2d 405, 411-12 (Il. 2003) (emphasis added) (marshaling
cases).
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approach is employed.46 Each prong of the plain error rule has a history
that predates the adoption of Rule 615(a).
47
a. Closely Balanced Evidence Prong
The recognition of the principle underlying the closely balanced
evidence prong can be traced back to Illinois Supreme Court decisions
in the early 1920s. The first case in which the court appears to have
relaxed the harsh sanction for forfeiture in a close case was People v.
Gardiner.48 The court faulted the defense counsel for failing to properly
preserve an error in the trial court but recognized a limited exception to
the forfeiture rule:
The fact that a person charged with crime is poorly defended will not
justify a reversal of the judgment where it is reasonably supported by
the evidence, but where the evidence is close .... and it is clear that
the prosecuting attorney has taken advantage of the accused because
he was poorly represented, and the trial court has permitted such
advantage to be taken, then we will consider the errors,
notwithstanding the failure to properly preserve the questions for
review.4
9
Almost two decades later, the court repeated that "[w]here the case is
close, we will consider errors in the record notwithstanding the failure
of counsel to save the questions for review, where it is clear that the
court has permitted the prosecuting attorney to take advantage of the
accused because he was poorly represented. 50 Yet, the court cautioned
that "we will not reverse a judgment of conviction which is manifestly
and unquestionably right simply because counsel did not try the case as
well as he should have."
51
More recently, the court noted that, even where an error does not
affect "substantial rights," "the threshold concern is just as often as not
whether the evidence presented was 'closely balanced.' The reason: the
strength or weakness of inculpatory evidence has long been seen as
relevant to ignoring procedural defaults in remedying occasioned
injustice."52 In this regard, the court explained that, in cases where the
evidence is closely balanced, the main purpose underlying the plain
error rule is "to protect against the 'possibility that an innocent person
46. Keene, 660 N.E.2d at 910.
47. See infra Parts 1l.A.3.a-b (analyzing the two prongs of the Illinois plain error test).
48. 135 N.E. 422,423 (Ill. 1922).
49. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
50. People v. Nowak, 24 N.E.2d 50, 50 (111. 1939).
51. Id.
52. People v. Keene, 660 N.E.2d 901,910 (111. 1995).
2006]
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may have been convicted due to some error which is obvious from the
record, but not properly preserved' for appellate review." 53  This
rationale is based upon the realization that in closely balanced cases
"the probability that a defendant's conviction was caused by even a
minor trial error is greatly enhanced. 54
b. Fair Trial Prong
Although one can trace the court's concern for ensuring that a
defendant "receive a fair and impartial trial" despite forfeited errors to
an earlier period,55 the substantial rights rationale underlying the fair
trial prong of the plain error rule clearly crystallized by the 1950s. For
example, in People v. Burson, the Illinois Suprenle Court observed:
The court may, as a matter of grace, in a case involving deprivation of
life or liberty, take notice of errors appearing upon the record which
deprived the accused of substantial means of enjoying a fair and
impartial trial, although no exceptions were preserved[,] or the
question is imperfectly presented.
56
Since that time, Illinois courts have identified a number of errors that
so seriously undermine the integrity of judicial proceedings as to
warrant reversal under the fair trial prong of the plain error rule. The
Illinois Supreme Court most recently applied the fair trial prong of Rule
615(a) where the right to a jury trial was implicated.57 The court has
also sanctioned reversals for serious prosecutorial misconduct in several
watershed decisions. 58  Other substantial errors that Illinois courts
reviewed under this prong include: judicial absence during a felony jury
trial;5 9 the admission of polygraph evidence; the denial of the right to
53. People v. Mullen, 566 N.E.2d 222, 226 (I11. 1990) (quoting People v. Carlson, 404 N.E.2d
233, 238 (Ill. 1980)).
54. Id.
55. Nowak, 24 N.E.2d at 51, 52 (remarking on several occasions when defendants did not
receive a "fair trial").
56. People v. Burson, 143 N.E.2d 239, 245 (Ill. 1957) (quoting 3 AM. JUR. Appeal and Error
§ 248 (1936)).
57. See People v. Bracey, 821 N.E.2d 253, 256-58 (I11. 2004) (granting defendant a new trial
where during a second trial he was not asked whether he wished to waive his right to a jury trial
as he had done in his first trial).
58. See People v. Johnson, 803 N.E.2d 405, 412, 423-25 (IUI. 2003) (reversing the convictions
of three defendants where prosecutors made improper remarks during closing argument); see also
People v. Blue, 724 N.E.2d 920, 940-42 (11. 2000) (granting a new trial due to the State's
improper suggestions to the jury and the introduction of a bloodied police uniform and
editorialized objections).
59. See People v. Vargas, 673 N.E.2d 1037, 1041-43 (I11. 996) (finding plain error where the
trial judge was absent during the Assistant State's Attorney's cross-examination of the defendant
in which he read into evidence a statement, describing the crime, taken by him from the
defendant).
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a trial by jury;6 1 subjecting a defendant to double jeopardy;62 directing a
verdict on lesser-included offenses;63 failing to provide the jury with
verdict forms on all counts charged;64 and suTlus convictions entered
in violation of the one-act, one-crime doctrine.
6
When applying Rule 615(a)'s fair trial prong, the reviewing court
determines "whether a substantial right has been affected to such a
degree that [the court] cannot confidently state that [the] defendant's
trial was fundamentally fair."66 As Justice Howard Ryan explained in
an oft-quoted special concurring opinion, the second prong of Illinois'
plain error rule "concerns the protection and preservation of the
integrity and reputation of the judicial process."67 Thus, where a
defendant's right to a fair trial has been denied, the court "must take
corrective action so that [it] may preserve the integrity of the judicial
process."
68
Significantly, a reviewing court will act on plain error under the fair
trial prong "regardless of the strength of the evidence of defendant's
guilt."69 As Justice Ryan noted, "'Even those guilty of the most heinous
offenses are entitled to a fair trial. Whatever the degree of guilt, those
charged with a... crime are entitled to be tried by the standards of guilt
which [the legislature] has prescribed."'
70
60. See People v. Baynes, 430 N.E.2d 1070, 1079 (Ill. 1981) (holding that admission of
polygraph evidence was plain error because the evidence was not reliable and there was a risk of
the jury construing the evidence as conclusive).
61. See People v. Bristow, 400 N.E.2d 511, 513-14 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1980) (reversing
conviction and granting a new trial where defense counsel did not reply to the trial court's
question of whether the defendant waived the right to a jury trial because the trial court has a duty
to make sure that a defendant's waiver is expressly made in open court).
62. See People v. Largent, 786 N.E.2d 1102, 1106-07, 1109 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 2003)
(asserting that the court may consider a claim of double jeopardy even though the defendant
failed to assert that claim by a post-trial motion after his second trial).
63. See People v. James, 626 N.E.2d 1337, 1345-47 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1993) (holding that
the trial judge's failure to give the jury the option of acquitting the defendant of arson had the
effect of directing a guilty verdict for that charge and was found to be plain error).
64. See People v. Scott, 612 N.E.2d 7, 9 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1993) (finding that the trial
court committed reversible error where it submitted verdict forms to the jury for only one of the
three counts charged in the indictment).
65. See People v. Quinones, 839 N.E.2d 583, 592-93 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2005) (finding
that the defendant's multiple convictions based on the same act violated the one-act, one-crime
doctrine and thus resulted in plain error).
66. People v. Blue, 724 N.E.2d 920, 940-41 (Ill. 2000).
67. People v. Green, 386 N.E.2d 272, 277 (Ill. 1979) (Ryan, J., specially concurring), quoted
in Blue, 724 N.E.2d at 941, and People v. Keene, 660 N.E.2d 901, 910 (Ill. 1995).
68. Blue, 724 N.E.2d at 940 (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 941.
70. Green, 386 N.E.2d at 277 (Ryan, J., specially concurring) (quoting Screws v. United
States, 325 U.S. 91, 107 (1945)).
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B. The Federal Plain Error Test
1. Rule 52(b)
Although it contains language similar to the Illinois rule, the federal
plain error rule has several significant differences that must be explored.
The federal plain error test derives from Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, which, in its present form, reads: "A plain error
that affects substantial rights may be considered even though it was not
brought to the court's attention."7 1 The most thorough explication of
the federal plain error test can be found in the United States Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Olano.7 2 Under that test, before an
appellate court can correct an error not raised at trial, there must be (1)
"error," (2) that is "plain," and (3) that "affect[s] substantial rights."7
The first element, "error," simply means a "[d]eviation from a legal
rule," unless such rule has been waived.74 The second element,
requiring that the error be "plain," refers to the fact that the error must
be "clear" or "obvious." 75
The third element under the federal rule is that the plain error must
"affect[] substantial rights." 76  This means that "the error must have
been prejudicial: It must have affected the outcome of the district court
proceedings." 77  To determine whether an error is prejudicial for
purposes of the plain error rule, the United States Supreme Court
instructs that the reviewing court must engage in an inquiry similar to
the traditional harmless error analysis required under Rule 52(a).78
There is one important difference, however, between a harmless error
analysis under Rule 52(a) and a plain error analysis under Rule 52(b):
namely, where a claim is procedurally defaulted, "[i]t is the defendant
rather than the Government who bears the burden of persuasion with
71. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). In 2002, the language of Rule 52(b) was amended "as part of the
general restyling of the Criminal Rules to make them more easily understood and to make style
and terminology consistent throughout the rules." FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b), advisory committee's
notes, 2002 amendments.
72. 507 U.S. 725 (1993).
73. Id. at 732. See also Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67 (1997) (identifying
the three conditions that must be met before a federal appellate court can correct an error not
raised at trial).
74. Olano, 507 U.S. at 732-33.
75. Id. at 734.
76. Id. at 732.
77. Id. at 734.
78. See id. (noting that an analysis under Rule 52(b) normally requires the same kind of
inquiry as a Rule 52(a) harmless error analysis).
464 [Vol. 37
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respect to prejudice." 79
Furthermore, Rule 52(b) is permissive rather than mandatory. 80  If
the aforementioned three conditions of Rule 52(b) are met, the
reviewing court may exercise its discretion to correct the error only if it
"'seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.' 81  Initially, the United States Supreme Court
utilized this language to describe the circumstances under which courts
could sua sponte take cognizance of significant errors. Presently,
however, this wording expresses "the standard that should guide the
exercise of remedial discretion under Rule 52(b)."82 This distinction
emphasizes the discretionary nature of plain error review in federal
courts. As the Court explained, "a plain error affecting substantial
rights does not, without more, satisfy the [remedial discretion] standard,
for otherwise the discretion afforded by Rule 52(b) would be
illusory."
83
2. Apprendi v. New Jersey
In the United States Supreme Court's landmark decision in Apprendi
v. New Jersey,84 the prosecution indicted the defendant on charges that
he fired several bullets into the home of a black family that recently
85
moved into an all-white neighborhood. None of the counts alleged
that the defendant acted with a racially motivated purpose. 86 After the
defendant pled guilty to, among other charges, possession of a firearm
for an unlawful purpose, which carried a maximum sentence of ten
years, the prosecution moved for an extended-term sentence under New
Jersey's "hate crime" enhancement statute.87 Following a hearing, the
trial judge found "by a preponderance of the evidence" that the
defendant's actions were racially motivated and increased the
defendant's sentence to twelve years.
88
Reversing the decision, the United States Supreme Court ruled that
79. Id. at 734-35.
80. Id. at 735.
81. Id. at 732 (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985)).
82. Id. at 736.
83. Id. at 737. In Olano, for example, the Court never reached the question of whether the
error "seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings"
because it held that the petitioners failed to demonstrate that the presence of alternate jurors
during jury deliberations was prejudicial such that it "affect[ed] substantial rights." Id. at 737-41.
84. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
85. Id. at 469.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 469-70.
88. Id. at 470-71.
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New Jersey's enhancement procedure ran afoul of constitutional notice
and jury trial rights by removing such fact-finding duties from the
jury.89 The Court uttered its now famous pronouncement that "[o]ther
than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for
a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to
a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."90
3. United States v. Cotton
In United States v. Cotton,91 the United States Supreme Court
addressed whether an Apprendi violation constituted plain error under
the federal rule.92 In Cotton, the defendants were charged with a drug
conspiracy, but the superseding indictment failed to allege the specific
levels of drug quantity that would trigger enhanced penalties. 93 After
the jury found the defendants guilty, the district judge made findings as
to the drug quantities and imposed sentences beyond the statutory
maximums permitted by the jury's verdict.94 The defendants did not
object to the enhanced sentences on this ground in the district court.95
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court held that the failure to
allege the drug quantities in the indictments did not rise to the level of
plain error because such an omission "did not seriously affect the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings" under
the federal plain error test.96 The Court based its conclusion on the fact
that the evidence as to drug quantity was overwhelming and "surely"
would have been found by the grand jury.97
C. A Comparison of the Illinois and Federal Plain Error Rules
As detailed above, Illinois' plain error rule provides greater legal
protections to defendants with respect to forfeited errors than its federal
counterpart. 98 This enables reviewing courts in Illinois, under both
prongs of the plain error rule, to more effectively prevent the conviction
of innocent persons and to safeguard the integrity of the criminal justice
89. Id. at 476-77, 491-92.
90. Id. at 490.
91. 535 U.S. 625 (2002).
92. Id. at 627.
93. Id. at 627-28.
94. Id. at 628.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 632-33.
97. Id. at 633.
98. See supra Parts II.A-B (discussing the Illinois plain error test and the federal plain error
test).
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system, respectively.
The most significant distinction between the federal plain error test
and the Illinois rule is that the former incorporates a harmless error
analysis into its determination of whether a forfeited error "affect[s]
substantial rights," while the latter does not.99 Because the federal rule
incorporates a harmless error analysis, it is, of course, much more
"prosecution-friendly" in nature, which is why the State fought so
vigorously to have it replace Illinois' traditional plain error rule.
100
Although this conclusion may seem self-evident to seasoned appellate
practitioners, it may not be readily apparent to those who are unfamiliar
with this rather confusing area of the law and therefore merits further
explanation.
Because the federal plain error rule incorporates a harmless error
analysis, before the reviewing court will even decide whether to review
an alleged forfeited error on the merits, the defendant must first meet his
burden of demonstrating that the error was prejudicial. 10 1 However, as
the United States Supreme Court has noted, "[i]n most cases, a court of
appeals cannot correct the forfeited error unless the defendant shows
that the error was prejudicial."' 1 2 For example, absent a jury note, it is a
difficult burden to demonstrate that a particular error had a prejudicial
impact on the deliberations of the jury. 10 3  In cases in which the
evidence against the accused is strong, the defendant will often be hard-
pressed to show that the error had an adverse influence on the verdict.
Moreover, even if a defendant satisfies his burden of showing prejudice,
the reviewing court can still decline to review the error unless it
"seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of
judicial proceedings." 10 4 And even then, the court is not required to do
so. 10 5 It is therefore little wonder why prosecutors laud the federal test,
as it eliminates appellate review of most forfeited errors because of
99. See supra Parts lI.A-B (explaining the different burdens of proof and analyses required
under the Illinois and federal plain error rules).
100. See infra Part II.E (describing the efforts of the Illinois State's Attorney's Office to
persuade the Illinois Supreme Court to adopt the federal plain error test).
101. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993) (explaining that under Rule 52(b),
the defendant has the burden of showing that the plain error was prejudicial before a court of
appeals can correct the error).
102. Id.
103. See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 16 n.14 (1985) ("[Flederal courts have
consistently interpreted the plain error doctrine as requiring an appellate court to find that the
claimed error.. . had an unfair prejudicial impact on the jury's deliberations.").
104. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 735-37 (articulating the standard for determining when a court of
appeals should correct a forfeited error).
105. See id. at 736 (clarifying that Rule 52(b) is permissive rather than mandatory).
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defendants' inability to demonstrate prejudicial error. 10 6
In contrast, under Illinois' plain error rule, which does not
incorporate a harmless error analysis, the court will review a forfeited
error "where either (1) the evidence is close, regardless of the
seriousness of the error, orl 2) the error is serious, regardless of the
closeness of the evidence." 7  This allows Illinois courts to correct
forfeited errors that may have contributed to the conviction of an
innocent defendant where the evidence was not overwhelming 10 8 and to
protect the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the strength of
the evidence against an individual defendant.'r 9 As a result, reviewing
courts in Illinois can ensure that the due process and fair trial rights of
all defendants are honored, not just the rights of defendants who pass an
exacting harmless error review.
Perhaps the most telling example of this distinction surrounds the
issue of prosecutorial misconduct. In People v. Young, the United
States Supreme Court addressed whether improper prosecutorial
remarks constituted plain error under Rule 52(b)'s plain error
formulation.110  In Young, the Court found that although the
prosecutor's statements were "inappropriate and amount[ed] to error,"
they "were not such as to undermine the fundamental fairness of the
trial and contribute to a miscarriage of justice."111 The Court further
pointed out that there was "overwhelming evidence" of the defendant's
intent to defraud, as well as his deliberate concealment of the fraudulent
scheme. 1 12 In short, the Court held that the strength of the evidence
against the defendant eliminated "any lingering doubt that the
prosecutor's remarks unfairly prejudiced the jury's
deliberations ... ." 113 Thus, the Court held that the prosecutor's
improper argument "did not constitute plain error warranting the Court
of Appeals to overlook the failure of the defense counsel to preserve the
point by timely objection." 114
On the other hand, the Illinois Supreme Court has taken a strong
106. See People v. Johnson, 803 N.E.2d 405, 411 (l. 2003) (memorializing the State's plea to
adopt the federal test and the State's admission that the application of the federal rule would alter
the outcome of the appellate court's judgment, which was in the defendant's favor).
107. People v. Herron, 830 N.E.2d 467,479 (Ill. 2005).
108. Id. at 475.
109. Id. at 478-79.
110. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1 (1985).
1ll. Id. at 16.
112. Id. at 19-20.
113. Id. at 19.
114. Id. at20.
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stand against the "'alarming' frequency" 115 of prosecutorial misconduct
and has found such behavior to be plain error "regardless of the
strength of the evidence of defendant's guilt."" 6  Most recently, in
People v. Johnson, the court declared that the type of prosecutorial
misconduct that permeated the trials under review "undermine[d] the
very foundations of our criminal justice system." 117  The court
explained, "[o]ur system of justice requires that a defendant's guilt or
innocence be determined based upon relevant evidence and legal
principles, upon the application of reason and deliberation by a jury, not
the expression of misdirected emotion or outrage by a mob.""' The
Illinois Supreme Court further warned:
Misconduct on the part of prosecutors cannot be allowed to continue
unchecked. To call it 'error' is to mischaracterize it, as it represents
nothing less than an attempt to subvert a defendant's fundamental
right to a fair trial. Multiple instances of this kind of conduct in the
course of a criminal trial threaten the trustworthiness and reputation of
the judicial process, and this court will take corrective action to
preserve the integrity of the process.
119
In Johnson, the court found that the pervasive pattern of prosecutorial
misconduct constituted plain error "irrespective of the state of the
evidence."'
120
This comparison makes clear the real and significant differences
between the Illinois and federal plain error rules.
D. Confusion in the Illinois Courts
1. Reliance on the Federal Plain Error Rule for Apprendi Cases
In its 2003 Supplemental Opinion in People v. Crespo, the Illinois
Supreme Court, without explanation, relied upon the federal plain error
test in a case implicating the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Apprendi v. New Jersey. 21
In Crespo, a jury convicted the defendant of first-degree murder.122
115. People v. Johnson, 803 N.E.2d 405, 425 (111. 2003).
116. People v. Blue, 724 N.E.2d 920, 941 (1I1. 2000).
117. Johnson, 803 N.E.2d at 425.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 425-26 (citation omitted).
120. Id. at 424.
121. People v. Crespo, 788 N.E.2d 1117, 1123-25 (I11. 2001), as modified upon denial of
rehearing (I11. 2003); see also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) ("Other than
the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.").
122. Crespo, 788 N.E.2d at 1118.
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The evidence established that the victim was stabbed with a large
kitchen knife, that she had more than twenty stab wounds, that such
force was used that the blade was bent to a 90-degree angle, and that a
large clump of the victim's hair, with the scalp still attached, had been
removed during the stabbing assault. 12 3  The trial court imposed a
seventy-five year extended-term sentence on the defendant based upon
its post-trial finding that the defendant committed the crime in an
exceptionally brutal or heinous manner. 
124
On rehearing, the defendant in Crespo alleged that the Illinois
Supreme Court should vacate this sentence because it violated the
mandate of Apprendi.12 5  Although the State conceded that the
defendant's sentence violated Apprendi, it contended that, under the
facts of the case, the violation was harmless error. 126 The defendant, in
response, asserted that because the error was structural in nature
harmless error review did not apply. 127 The court determined that plain
error analysis was appropriate because the defendant failed to object at
trial. 128
Rather than applying the Illinois plain error rule, the court then turned
to the federal plain error test, as it had been recently applied in
Cotton. 12 9 The Illinois Supreme Court reached "the same conclusion by
the same reasoning" as -the United States Supreme Court had in
Cotton.130 Because overwhelming evidence had been produced that the
crimes were committed in an exceptionally brutal or heinous manner,
the Illinois Supreme Court refused to consider the issue as plain error
because "the defendant failed to show that the error was prejudicial."' 3
Also noteworthy is People v. Thurow, which was issued prior to the
Supplemental Opinion in Crespo.13 2 In Thurow, the Illinois Supreme
Court briefly discussed the federal plain error rule in the context of
distinguishing harmless error analysis from that of plain error review in
123. Id. at 1125.
124. Id. at 1123.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1123-24.
127. Id. at 1124.
128. Id.
129. Id.; see also United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002) (holding that the indictment's
failure to list the quantity of drugs that ultimately resulted in an enhanced sentence did not rise to
the level of plain error). Cotton, in turn, relied upon the explication of the test as set forth in
Olano. See Cotton, 535 U.S. at 631-32 (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732
(1993)).
130. Crespo, 788 N.E.2d at 1124.
131. Id. at 1125.
132. People v. Thurow, 786 N.E.2d 1019 (111. 2003).
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an effort to discern whether Apprendi errors could be deemed
harmless. 133  In this regard, the court noted that where a timely
objection is made, as in Thurow, the State bears the burden of
persuasion with respect to prejudice, while in cases subject to plain
error review, where a timely objection is not interposed, the burden of
persuasion falls on the defendant. 134  The court ultimately concluded
that Apprendi violations were subject to harmless error review 135 and
that the error at bar was harmless because there was overwhelming
evidence that the victim was a member of defendant's household for
sentencing enhancement purposes. 1
36
2. Confusion in the Illinois Appellate Courts Following Crespo
The Illinois Supreme Court relied upon the federal plain error test in
Crespo only in the context of Apprendi sentencing errors and never
utilized such test for forfeited errors outside of that limited context.
137
Soon, however, references to the federal test in non-Apprendi contexts
began to enter into certain Illinois appellate decisions and indicated a
marked confusion on the part of various panels as to how to define plain
error. 
138
The first reported Illinois appellate case to apply the federal plain
error rule in a non-Apprendi context appears to be People v. Tisley.
139
In Tisley, a jury convicted the defendant of armed robbery. 140 After the
police received a description of the offender from the victim, the police
apprehended the defendant and placed him in a show-up with four other
individuals. 141 The victim identified the defendant as the robber. 142 On
appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in giving the jury
a witness identification instruction that departed from the criminal
pattern instructions. 14 3 The defendant failed to object to the instruction
133. Id. at 1025; see supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the differences between plain error and
harmless error analysis).
134. Thurow, 786 N.E.2d at 1025.
135. Id. at 1028.
136. Id. at 1030.
137. See supra Part .D.I (discussing the Illinois Supreme Court's reliance on the federal
plain error test only in the context of Apprendi sentencing errors); see also infra note 165 and
accompanying text (noting four cases, decided after Crespo, in which the Illinois Supreme Court
analyzed non-Apprendi forfeited errors under Illinois' traditional plain error test).
138. See infra notes 139-158 and accompanying text (discussing appellate court's application
of the federal plain error test in the Apprendi and non-Apprendi contexts).
139. People v. Tisley, 793 N.E.2d 181 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2003).
140. Id. at 183.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 184. The instructional error that the court considered is commonly known as a
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in the trial court.144
In a two-to-one decision authored by Justice Patrick Quinn of the
First District, the majority in Tisley applied the federal plain error test to
determine whether the giving of the identification instruction
constituted plain error. 145 The majority relied specifically on Crespo,
applied the federal test, and found that the instruction was not plain
error because the defendant failed to show that he was prejudiced. 146
More importantly, however, the majority concluded its decision by
stating that "we also hold that when the issue is waived, as here, it is
only reviewable under a plain error analysis, as explained in People v.
Crespo."1
47
Justice Ellis Reid dissented, asserting that the Illinois plain error
standard should have been applied. 148 Justice Reid began his dissent as
follows:
I believe this matter should be remanded for a new trial in order to
protect the process .... While I understand that remanding the matter
may seem to be a futile act, one that may only serve as instructive in
terms of future cases with other defendants, I believe it is necessary
because of the fundamental nature of the rights at stake when a body
politic takes steps to deprive a citizen of his liberty. 
1 4 9
After outlining the Illinois standard and highlighting its disjunctive
nature, Justice Reid pointed out that "even in a case where the relative
closeness of the evidence is not necessarily an issue, plain error review
can still be proper where the asserted error is fundamental to the
integrity of the judicial process."'150  Justice Reid concluded by stating
that, regardless of the evidence against the defendant, the accused did
Gonzalez issue, based upon the appellate court's decision in People v. Gonzalez, 761 N.E.2d 198
(Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2001).
144. Tisley, 793 N.E.2d at 184.
145. Justice Quinn seemed to be the most zealous judicial advocate in favor of adopting the
federal plain error test. See, e.g., Tisley, 793 N.E.2d at 185-87 (Quinn, J., authoring) (applying
federal plain error test to jury instruction issue and making a judicial pronouncement that, in the
future, forfeited errors were only reviewable under the federal plain error test); People v.
Schickel, 807 N.E.2d 1195, 1204 (1I1. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2004) (Quinn, J., specially concurring)
(combining Rule 615(a) and the federal test and remarking that "I completely concur with
everything in the majority's decision."), appeal denied, 823 N.E.2d 976 (1l. 2004); cf People v.
Saraceno, 791 N.E.2d 1239, 1246-50 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2003) (Quinn, J., dissenting)
(dissenting where the majority found plain error under the closely balanced evidence prong of
Rule 615(a) and advocating for a harmless error analysis).
146. Tisley, 793 N.E.2d at 186-87.
147. Id. at 187 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
148. Id. at 188 (Reid, J., dissenting).
149. Id.
150. Id.
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not receive a fair trial as a result of the trial court's instructional error
and, therefore, should be given a new trial.
15 1
After Tisley, other Illinois courts likewise applied the federal plain
error test to non-Apprendi errors. For example, in People v. Durgan,
the Fourth District applied the federal plain error test to determine
whether the trial court's juror replacement procedure could be treated as
plain error. 15 2 In People v. Sharp, the same court, relying upon Crespo,
applied the federal test in refusing to address the defendant's
prosecutorial misconduct argument, In People v. Schickel, which
involved the trial court's alleged failure to inform the defendant of the
possible penalties for involuntary manslaughter, the First District
refused to find plain error. 154  The court referenced Rule 615(a) but
engrafted the multi-step federal plain error test onto it rather than
applying it as a free-standing test.-55 Somewhat similarly, in People v.
Brooks, the First District referred to both Rule 615(a) and the federal
plain error test in finding that a prosecutor's comment in closing
argument was not a prejudicial error that affected the defendant's
substantial rights.
156
Some Illinois courts limited the application of the federal plain error
rule to Apprendi errors while they maintained Rule 615(a)'s plain error
rule for all other errors. In People v. Coleman, the court considered a
trial error regarding the scope of cross-examination under Rule 615(a)'s
plain error rule while, in the same decision, it analyzed an alleged
Apprendi violation under the federal plain error test.157  Likewise, in
People v. Simmons, the court analyzed defendant's claims of
prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel pursuant
to Rule 615(a) but considered the defendant's argument that his
extended-term sentence violated Apprendi under the federal plain error
rule. 15
8
The foregoing cases demonstrate the chaos that prevailed in the
151. Id. at 189.
152. People v. Durgan, 806 N.E.2d 1233, 1245-47 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 2004), appeal
denied, 839 N.E.2d 1029 (111. 2005).
153. People v. Sharp, 825 N.E.2d 706, 715-16 (I11. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 2005).
154. People v. Schickel, 807 N.E.2d 1195 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2004), appeal denied, 823
N.E.2d 976 (Ill. 2004).
155. Id. at 1204.
156. People v. Brooks, 803 N.E.2d 626, 629, 631 (111. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2004), appeal denied,
824 N.E.2d 286 (111. 2004). In fact, the court even engaged in a separate harmless error analysis.
Id. at 633.
157. People v. Coleman, 806 N.E.2d 1113, 1119-22 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2004), appeal
denied, 823 N.E.2d 970 (I11. 2004).
158. People v. Simmons, 794 N.E.2d 995, 999-1000 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2003).
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appellate districts prior to the Illinois Supreme Court's clarification of
the appropriate application of the plain error standard.
E. Efforts of the State's Attorney's Office to Abrogate Illinois' Plain
Error Test
The State's Attorney's Office seized upon this confusion to advance
its support of the prosecution-friendly federal plain error test. In fact,
these efforts began prior to the issuance of the Supplemental Opinion in
Crespo. In People v. Johnson, for example, which was argued prior to
the release of Crespo's Supplemental Opinion, 159 the Illinois Supreme
Court highlighted the efforts by the State to persuade the court to
abandon its traditional formulation of plain error analysis in favor of the
federal rule:
[T]he State in oral argument requested that we declare the plain error
rule to be a standard of review rather than an exception to the "waiver
doctrine." The State also claims that "the closely balanced evidence
test applied to Supreme Court Rule 615(a)'s plain error clause is...
confusing and unworkable, it creates an internal conflict with Rule
615(a)'s harmless error clause, and should therefore be abandoned and
replaced by the test used in the federal system to identify plain error."
The State urges us to abrogate our longstanding formulation of plain
error analysis and adopt the "federal test," as set forth in United States
v. Olano .... 160
But the Illinois Supreme Court declined to address the State's
contentions in Johnson.16 1  Instead, the court applied the traditional
Illinois plain error rule to the errors at issue. 162 Later in its decision, the
court referred briefly to the federal test and stated, "[i]n passing, we
note that our disposition would be the same had we applied the Olano
standard."' 1
63
Following the issuance of the Supplemental Opinion in Crespo, the
Illinois Supreme Court, in addition to the subsequent release of its
opinion in Johnson,164 issued no less than four decisions involving non-
159. People v. Johnson, 803 N.E.2d 405 (i1. 2003). Oral argument in Johnson was conducted
on November 13, 2002, more than four months prior to issuance of the Supplemental Opinion in
Crespo. See People v. Crespo, 788 N.E.2d 1117, 1117 (Ill. 2001), as modified upon denial of
rehearing (Ill. 2003) (explaining Apprendi violation was not prejudicial and therefore was not
plain error).
160. Johnson, 803 N.E.2d at 411.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 423. In its discussion, the Court expressed its view that pervasive prosecutorial
misconduct would qualify as a "structural" defect under the federal rule. Id. at 423-24.
164. Johnson was decided on October 17, 2003, more than six months subsequent to the
release of the Supplemental Opinion in Crespo. Id. at 405.
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Apprendi issues in which the court analyzed the forfeited errors under
Illinois' traditional plain error test. 16 5  Undeterred by these decisions,
the State's Attorney's Office inundated the appellate courts with
arguments that all forfeited errors had to be analyzed under the federal
plain error standard referred to in Crespo. 1
66
III. SUBJECT OPINIONS
The State's campaign to abrogate Illinois' plain error rule ultimately
found its way to the Illinois Supreme Court, which resolved the issue in
People v. Herron and People v. Durr. People v. Herron involved the
State's challenge to the viability of the closely balanced evidence prong
of the plain error test. 167  In Herron, the Illinois Supreme Court
explicitly rejected the State's request to eliminate Illinois' traditional
plain error rule and defined, in substantial detail, the parameters of
Illinois' plain error standard. People v. Durr, on the other hand,
concerned Rule 615(a)'s fair trial prong. 168  In Durr, the court
specifically enunciated the operation of Illinois' plain error rule in the
context of instructional errors.
169
A. People v. Herron
In People v. Herron, the Illinois Supreme Court tackled the enigmatic
question of what constitutes plain error. 170  In Herron, a Jury convicted
the defendant of first-degree murder and armed robbery. The sole
issue raised on direct appeal was whether the trial judge erred by
improperly instructing the jury concerning eyewitness identification
165. See People v. Bracey, 821 N.E.2d 253, 256 (Ill. 2004) (applying fair trial prong of Rule
615(a) where right to jury trial was implicated); People v. Evans, 808 N.E.2d 939, 956-57 (I11.
2004) (involving alleged prosecutorial misconduct); People v. Graham, 795 N.E.2d 231, 238 (I11.
2003) (regarding use of defendant's post-arrest silence); People v. Ceja, 789 N.E.2d 1228, 1242-
43 (Ill. 2003) (concerning expert opinion testimony).
166. Prior to the Illinois Supreme Court's decisions in Herron and Durr, the Office of the
State Appellate Defender was deluged with briefs from the State's Attorney's Office containing
lengthy argument on this point. See, e.g., Brief for Appellee at 22-29, People v. Brice Leslie, No.
1-04-0950 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. Mar. 18, 2005) (analyzing alleged errors under federal test);
Brief for Appellee at 27-36, People v. Melchor, 841 N.E.2d 420 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2005)
(No. 1-03-3036) (arguing the federal plain error test).
167. People v. Herron, 830 N.E.2d 467 (1I1. 2005); see also infra Part III.A (discussing the
scope of the plain error test as explained in People v. Herron).
168. People v. Durr, 830 N.E.2d 527 (Ill. 2005); see also infra Part II1.B (explaining the
court's analysis of the plain error rule for jury instruction errors).
169. Durr, 830 N.E.2d at 536.
170. Herron, 830 N.E.2d at 467. "The central issue in this case is what constitutes plain error,
or more specifically, what standard a reviewing court should use in deciding whether to excuse
procedural default of an issue on appeal." Id. at 469.
171. Id.
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testimony. 172 The defendant neither objected to the instruction at trial
nor raised the issue in a post-trial motion. 173 The defendant, however,
asked the appellate court to address the issue under the plain error
doctrine. 174  The appellate court, after considering the alleged
instructional error under the plain error rule, reversed the defendant's
convictions and remanded the case for a new trial.175
Before the Illinois Supreme Court, the State "challenge[d] the
continued viability of the 'closely balanced evidence prong"' of Illinois'
traditional plain error rule and asked the court to adopt the federal plain
error rule. 1-7 6  More specifically, the State argued that "the closely
balanced evidence prong improperly shifts the burden of persuasion
from the defendant to the State to show the error was not prejudicial,
effectively rendering the failure to preserve the error
inconsequential." 177 Accordingly, the State asked the court to abandon
its longstanding disjunctive test and to instead embrace the federal plain
error test. 
178
In addition, the State asserted that in People v. Thurow179 and People
v. Crespo,180 the Illinois Supreme Court had already "adopted the
federal test, but inexplicably retreated to the disjunctive test in later
cases." 18  The State also contended that Rule 615(a)'s harmless error
and plain error clauses, when read in conjunction, "indicate[d] that both
preserved and unpreserved errors must be prejudicial before a reviewing
court may reverse."
182
After tracing the history of Illinois' plain error rule, reviewing its
Apprendi decisions in People v. Crespo and People v. Thurow, and
noting the divergent treatment of plain error in the appellate courts as a
result of its reliance on the federal plain error test in Crespo, the court
emphasized the congruency between the federal and state tests,
172. Id.
173. Id. Ironically, although the majority of the Court's opinion dealt with the history of
Illinois' plain error rule as it developed under Rule 615(a), Herron's case technically fell under
the rubric of Rule 451(c) because he failed to object to the instructional error during the trial
stage. See People v. Keene, 660 N.E.2d 901, 916 (I11. 1995) (explaining that Rule 451(c) and
615(a) are construed identically).
174. Herron, 830 N.E.2d at 471.
175. Id. at471-72.
176. Id. at 469-70.
177. Id. at 475.
178. Id.
179. 786 N.E.2d 1019 (111. 2003).
180. 788 N.E.2d 1117 (Ill. 2001), as modified upon denial of rehearing (I11. 2003).
181. Herron, 830 N.E.2d at 476.
182. Id.
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remarking that "[b]oth the texts of the federal and state plain-error rules,
as well as their interpretation by the United States and Illinois Supreme
Courts, are similar." 183 With respect to the individual prongs of the
federal plain error rule, the court explained that both the federal and
state tests: (1) require error; (2) require that the error must be plain; (3)
require that the error must affect substantial rights; and (4) take into
account "the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial
proceedings." 184 Therefore, the court dismissed the State's claim that
the federal and state plain error tests were "diametrically opposed" or
"fundamentally divergent," opining that "[u]ltimately, plain error
involves the same considerations in federal and state court" and
accounting for the differences as an outcome of the common law
process. 185 The court concluded its analysis on this point by noting
that, "[o]ver time, different justices of different courts have added their
idiosyncratic language to the case law, but changes in the language of
plain error have not resulted in changes in the meaning of plain
error." 
186
Similarly, the court rejected the State's argument that the Court
adopted the federal plain error test in its decisions in Thurow and
Crespo.187 Instead, as explained by the Court, because a question of
first impression was raised in the rehearing petition in Crespo, "we
understandably sought guidance from a superior court that already had
decided that issue."' 188 To avoid any future confusion, the court tersely
declared: "We did not adopt Olano."189 Rather, the court stated that it
only referred to the federal plain error test "because, at its core, it is the
same standard we already use."
' 190
The court also rejected the State's characterization of plain error as a
"standard of review." 19 1 The court pointed out that the term "'standard
of review' denotes '[t]he criterion by which an appellate court...
measures ... the propriety of an order, finding, or judgment entered by
a lower court.""' 1 2 Thus, the "plain error test is not a standard of
183. Id. at473-78.
184. Id. at 478-79.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at475 n.1.
192. Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1441 (8th ed. 2004)).
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review."' 19 3  The standard of review "refers to the stance that a
reviewing court takes with respect to a trial court error, and is thus the
wrong label in the context of plain error, where there is no trial court
order to review."' 194 According to the court, "[t]he plain error test ... is
more aptly described as a standard to help a reviewing court determine
when to excuse forfeiture." 1
95
The court then proceeded to reaffirm the disjunctive nature of
Illinois' plain error test, which, according to the court, "does not offer
two divergent interpretations of plain error, but instead two different
ways to ensure the same thing-namely, a fair trial."' 196
With respect to the closely balanced evidence prong, the court stated
that "where the evidence in a case is so closely balanced that the jury's
guilty verdict may have resulted from the error and not the evidence, a
reviewing court may consider a forfeited error in order to preclude an
argument that an innocent person was wrongly convicted." 97 In such
situations, the court noted that "the defendant must show both that there
was plain error and that the evidence was so closely balanced that the
error alone severely threatened to tip the scales of justice against
him." 198 For its part, the State may reply to the defendant by arguing
that the evidence was strongly weighted against the defendant and thus
not closely balanced. 199
In discussing the fair trial prong, the court stated that "where the error
is so serious that the defendant was denied a substantial right, and thus a
fair trial, a reviewing court may consider a forfeited error in order to
preserve the integrity of the judicial process. ' 2°° In other words, "the
defendant must prove there was plain error and that the error was so
serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant's trial and
challenged the integrity of the judicial process. ' 2° 1 Under the fair trial
prong, "[pirejudice to the defendant is presumed because of the
importance of the right involved, 'regardless of the strength of the
evidence"' against the defendant. 20
2
Yet, as to demonstrating plain error under either prong, the court
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 475.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 479.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 475.
201. Id. at 479-80.
202. Id. at 480.
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emphasized that "the burden of persuasion remains with the
defendant." In sum, "the plain-error doctrine bypasses normal
forfeiture principles and allows a reviewing court to consider
unpreserved error when either (1) the evidence is close, regardless of the
seriousness of the error, or (2) the error is serious, regardless of the
closeness of the evidence."204
Finally, the court turned to the merits of the defendant's argument
concerning the identification instruction at issue.20 5  The court noted
that although instructional errors rise to the level of plain error only
where they "create[] a serious risk" that a jury may have incorrectly
entered a guilty verdict against a defendant due to a lack of
understanding of the applicable law, "the seriousness of the risk
depends upon the quantum of evidence presented by the State against
the defendant." 206  Significantly, the court emphasized that in a case
falling under the closely balanced evidence prong, "[t]he defendant need
not prove that the error in the instruction actually misled the jury."207
Instead, the court declared that "[i]f the defendant carries the burden of
persuasion and convinces a reviewing court that there was error and that
the evidence was closely balanced, the case is not cloaked with a
presumption of prejudice. The error is actually prejudicial, not
,208presumptively prejudicial. Because there was only one eyewitness
who could identify the defendant, as well as a conflicting physical
description by another witness, the court found that the defendant, by
demonstrating that the evidence was closely balanced, proved that the
trial court's instructional error was prejudicial. 20 9  Accordingly, the
court affirmed the appellate court's decision reversing the defendant's
convictions and remanding the case for a new trial.21 °
203. Id.
204. Id. at 479.
205. Id. at 480. In short, the Court concluded that the trial court's instruction, which, contrary
to the Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction (IPI) (Criminal) committee notes and sample set
instructions, included the disjunctive term "or" between each of the identification factors, was
plain error because it may have misled ordinary jurors into believing that they could find the
identification testimony of an eyewitness reliable based upon just one of the factors listed in the
instruction. Id. at 480-82. Parenthetically, the Court ruled that the instruction constituted plain
error "regardless of any further comment on it by the State in its closing argument." Id. at 482.
206. Id. at 483.
207. Id.
208. Id. (emphasis added). In explaining this rationale, the Court eloquently stated, "We deal
with probabilities, not certainties; we deal with risks and threats to the defendant's rights. When
there is error in a close case, we choose to err on the side of fairness, so as not to convict an
innocent person." Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at483-84.
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B. People v. Durr
In People v. Durr, the court found that the trial court's non-pattern
jury instructions constituted error. 2 11 But the court held that such error
did not rise to the level of plain error because the defendant failed to
demonstrate that the instructions caused a "severe threat" to the fairness
of his trial and compromised the integrity of the proceedings.
212
Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of three counts of
predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and one count of aggravated
kidnapping. 2 13 On direct appeal, the defendant contended that the trial
judge erred in giving non-Illinois Pattern Instructions (IPI) to the jury
and thereby deprived the jury of the option of fully acquitting him on all
the offenses, namely, both the greater- and lesser-included offenses.
2 14
Although the defendant tendered the correct pattern instruction on
greater- and lesser-included offenses at trial, the defendant failed to
include the instructional issue in a post-trial motion. 2 1  Still, the
defendant asked the appellate court to address the issue under the fair
trial prong of the plain error doctrine.
216
The appellate court, after considering the alleged instructional errors
under the second prong of Rule 615(a)'s plain error rule, reversed the
defendant's convictions and remanded the case for a new trial, finding
that the trial court's non-IPI instructions denied the jury "the
opportunity to acquit defendant of the lesser-included offenses." Yet,
upon denying the State's ensuing petition for leave to appeal, the
Illinois Supreme Court issued a supervisory order vacating the appellate
court's judgment and remanding the case for reconsideration in light of
its decisions in People v. Crespo and People v. Thurow.2 18 On remand,
211. People v. Durr, 830 N.E.2d 527, 541 (I11. 2005).
212. Id. at 537-38, 541.
213. Id. at 539.
214. Id. at 529, 533.
215. Id. at 533, 536. Duff's case technically fell under Rule 615(a) because he failed to
include the instructional issue in his motion for a new trial, as opposed to failing to raise the issue
during the trial stage. Id. at 535.
216. Id. at 529.
217. Id. at 533.
218. Id. at 529. See People v. Duff, 796 N.E.2d 1062, 1062-63 (I11. 2003) (supervisory order)
(directing the appellate court to vacate its judgment and reconsider it in light of People v. Crespo,
788 N.E.2d 1117 (I11. 2001), and People v. Thurow, 786 N.E.2d 1019 (Ill. 2003)). This was
apparently the result of an error, as Duff's case did not raise any Apprendi issues. Moreover, the
Court began its legal analysis by noting that "supervisory orders issued by this court are
'nonprecedential."' Durr, 830 N.E.2d at 534. See also People v. Crespo, 788 N.E.2d 1117 (Ill.
2001) (applying the federal plain error test), as modified upon denial of rehearing (I11. 2003);
People v. Thurow, 786 N.E.2d 1019 (I1l. 2003) (concluding that Apprendi violations were subject
to harmless error review).
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the appellate court, as instructed, revisited the instructional issues under
the federal plain error test and held "that the giving of the altered
instruction by the trial court was not error and that defendant was not
deprived of a fair trial. ' 2 9  The Illinois Supreme Court granted the
defendant's petition for leave to appeal.220 On appeal to the high court,
the defendant alleged "that the appellate court 'erred in applying the
federal plain-error test to [his] case"' and that application of Illinois'
plain error test would have altered the outcome of the appeal.22'
In addressing the defendant's claim, the Illinois Supreme Court
pointed out that "we can review any question not otherwise properly
preserved if we believe that plain error affecting a substantial right may
have occurred." 222 Because the evidence was not closely balanced, the
court reviewed the defendant's assertion of error under Rule 615(a)'s
fair trial prong.
The court began its discussion by noting that a defendant who raises a
forfeited instructional error bears the burden of persuasion. 223  In this
regard, the court, borrowing from its recent decision in People v.
224Hopp, which involved a case under Rule 45 1(c), explained that that
rule, which is analogous to Rule 615(a), "does not require that
defendant prove beyond doubt that [his] trial was unfair because [an
instructional error] misled the jury to convict [him]. It does require that
[he] show that the error caused a severe threat to the fairness of [his]
trial. 225 Accordingly, in order to demonstrate plain error, a defendant
must show that the instructional error "creates a serious risk that the
jurors incorrectly convicted the defendant because they did not
understand the applicable law, so as to severely threaten the fairness of
the trial."2
26
Turning to the merits of the defendant's claim, the court first
addressed whether the trial court committed error in failing to accept the
defendant's tendered IPI charge instruction concerning greater- and
219. Durr, 830 N.E.2d at 529.
220. Id.
221. Id. Although the defendants in both Durr and Herron argued for the retention of Illinois'
traditional plain error standard and against the adoption of the federal plain error test, the Court
chose to address the issue in its opinion in Herron. Id. at 534 ("[W]e note that the interrelation
and consistency of federal and state plain error standards are matters this court has recently
addressed in People v. Herron .... We need not do so here.").
222. Id, at 536 (quoting People v. Shaw, 713 N.E.2d 1161, 1175 (I11. 1998) (emphasis added)).
223. Id.
224. 805 N.E.2d 1190 (111. 2004).
225. Durr, 830 N.E.2d at 536 (quoting Hopp, 805 N.E.2d at 1197).
226. Id. (quoting Hopp, 805 N.E.2d at 1194).
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lesser-included offenses. 227  The court first ruled that the trial court
erred in refusing to give the defendant's instruction. 228 The court then
held that the trial judge erred in giving non-IPI instructions on this
subject because he did not find that the proffered instruction failed to
accurately state the law, as is required by Illinois Supreme Court Rule
45 1(a).
Notwithstanding these errors, the court ruled that the trial court's
instructional errors were de minimus and did not result in "fundamental
unfairness" or cause a "severe threat" to the integrity of the trial
proceedings in defendant's case. 23  Although the correct 1IP verdict
forms were not given to the jury, the court found that "adequate verdict
forms were read to the jury" and that the jurors were adequately
apprised of their option of acquitting the defendant on all three of the
offenses at issue, i.e., the greater- and two lesser-included offenses.
23 1
As such, the court concluded that the defendant did not establish plain
error.2 32 Yet, importantly for future cases, the court cautioned that
[i]f the instructions given the jury had denied the jury the option of
returning a general "not guilty" verdict, as defendant contends, a
significant structural error would have occurred for purposes of our
rules, substantial rights would in fact have been violated, and the
fairness and integrity of the trial process would have been
compromised.
23 3
Because the defendant was unable to demonstrate plain error, the
court held that "the procedural default must be honored. 234 Thus, the
court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court. 235
227. The issue at bar revolved around the application of Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction
(Criminal), No. 2.01 R (4th ed. 2000).
228. "That IPI instruction, along with a corresponding concluding instruction and verdict
forms, would have encouraged the jury to examine the elements of each offense separately, and
would have emphasized the need for independent consideration of each offense." Durr, 830
N.E.2d at 537.
229. Id. See also ILL. SUP. CT. R. 451 (a) (ordering that where the IPI does not accurately
state the law, an instruction should be given that is "simple, brief, impartial, and free from
argument").
230. Durr, 830 N.E.2d at 537.
231. Id. at 541. In Durr's case, the greater offense was predatory criminal sexual assault of a
child, while the two lesser-included offenses were attempted predatory criminal sexual assault of
a child and aggravated criminal sexual abuse. Id. at 531.
232. Id. at 538.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 541.
235. Id.
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IV. ANALYSIS
A closer analysis of both cases reveals their significance for Illinois
practitioners. In People v. Herron, the court strongly reaffirmed its
commitment to Illinois' plain error rule and correctly refused to adopt
the federal plain error rule.236  Although the court's scholarly opinion
will greatly benefit practitioners in so far as it succinctly defines the
parameters of Illinois' disjunctive test, the court's reasoning was flawed
to the extent that it attempted to equate the state and federal plain error
tests.2 37  An analysis of People v. Durr clearly exemplifies the
continued importance of adhering to the traditional Illinois rule rather
than allowing the abrogation of that rule in favor of the more
prosecution-friendly federal rule.
238
A. Herron: An Improper Comparison to the Federal Rule
Contrary to the court's dicta in Herron, the federal plain error rule is
not "the same standard we already use." 23 9 Although the two tests share
certain similar elements, the tests are substantively different, as the
federal test includes a harmless error analysis and the state test does
not. 24  This distinction is critical and highlights the reason why the
State campaigned so vigorously to abrogate Illinois' plain error test in241
favor of the prosecution-friendly federal test. In addition, the rules
are different with respect to their discretionary and ministerial natures,
their scope, and their origin.2 42  Furthermore, an examination of the
legal distinctions between the two tests is necessary to expose the
State's newest efforts to undermine the court's holding through its
advancement in the appellate courts of the argument that a harmless
error analysis is required under Illinois' plain error rule.
243
236. People v. Herron, 830 N.E.2d 467,470, 479 (Ill. 2005).
237. See infra Part IV.A (examining the error in comparing the state and federal plain error
tests).
238. See infra Part IV.B (discussing Illinois' traditional plain error rule and its importance to
Illinois' criminal justice system).
239. Herron, 830 N.E.2d at 479.
240. See supra Part II.C (comparing the Illinois and federal plain error tests).
241. See supra Part II.E (discussing the efforts of the Illinois' State's Attorney's Office to
abrogate Illinois' plain error test).
242. See supra Parts II.A-C (examining the development and application of both the Illinois
and federal plain error tests).
243. For example, in a post-Herron brief, the State contended that "under the plain error
doctrine embodied in Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(a), defendant bears the burden of
establishing that the error was prejudicial." Brief for Appellee at 63, People v. Donald Gordon,
No. 1-04-0167 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. Sep. 21, 2005). In support of its claim, the State cited to
People v. Thurow, 786 N.E.2d 1019, 1025 (11. 2003). Thurow, however, was a harmless error,
not a plain error, case. Id. at 1025. More importantly, the proposition proffered by the State is
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With respect to the elements of the federal and state plain error tests,
it is uncontested that, as construed by the courts, the respective tests
employ similar terminology. Both federal and state tests require
"error.'244 Likewise, with regard to what is "plain," there seems to be
no marked distinction between the federal and state tests.
245
The analysis of the third limitation under the federal test, however, is
wholly distinct and highlights the significant, substantive differences
between the federal and state plain error inquiries. The third and final
element under Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is
that the plain error must "affect[] substantial rights," which has been
246construed to mean that the error must be prejudicial. Further, "[i]t is
the defendant rather than the Government who bears the burden of
persuasion with respect to prejudice." 247  Therefore, under Rule 52(b),
the reviewing court must engage in a harmless error inquiry, just as if it
was conducting a traditional harmless error analysis under Rule 52(a) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
248
In direct contrast to the federal test, Illinois' plain error rule does not
include a harmless error analysis under either prong. 249 With respect to
paraphrased from language quoted in Thurow that involved the federal plain error rule, which
incorporates a harmless error analysis, not the Illinois test. Id. Moreover, in Herron, the Illinois
Supreme Court explicitly rejected the notion that a defendant must demonstrate prejudice in cases
falling under the fair trial prong of Illinois' plain error rule, which was at issue in Gordon. See
Herron, 830 N.E.2d at 480 ("Prejudice is presumed because of the importance of the right
involved .... ").
244. Compare United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-33 (1993) (noting that a "deviation
from a legal rule" is "error"), with People v. Sims, 736 N.E.2d 1048, 1064 (Ill. 2000) ("Before
invoking the plain error exception ... 'it is appropriate to determine whether error occurred at
all."' (quoting People v. Wade, 546 N.E.2d 553, 555 (111. 1989)).
245. Compare Olano, 507 U.S. at 734 (holding that for an error to be "plain," it must be
"clear" or "obvious"), with People v. Keene, 660 N.E.2d 901, 910 (Ill. 1995) ("[S]hort of a
conclusion that an asserted error is a 'plain' one, the so-called plain error doctrine offers no basis
to excuse a procedural default."). In Illinois, "to determine whether a purported error is 'plain'
requires a substantive look at it." Keene, 660 N.E.2d at 910. Moreover, "while all plain errors
are reversible ones, not all reversible errors are also 'plain."' Id.
246. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734. According to the United States Supreme Court, "affecting
substantial rights" means, in most cases, that "the error must have been prejudicial: It must have
affected the outcome of the district court proceedings." Id. The Court further explained that:
When the defendant has made a timely objection to an error and Rule 52(a) applies, a
court of appeals normally engages in a specific analysis of the district court record-a
so-called 'harmless error' inquiry-to determine whether the error was prejudicial.
Rule 52(b) [the plain error rule] normally requires the same kind of inquiry....
Id. (emphasis added).
247. Id.
248. "Normally, although perhaps not in every case, the defendant must make a specific
showing of prejudice to satisfy the 'affecting substantial rights' prong of Rule 52(b)." Id. at 735.
249. People v. Green, 386 N.E.2d 272, 276-78 (il. 1979) (Ryan, J., specially concurring).
Under the Illinois rule, "[b]efore plain error can be considered as a means of circumventing the
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the closely balanced evidence prong, more than a quarter-of-a-century
ago, Justice Ryan wrote that, "the court will look at the record only to
see if the evidence is 'closely balanced.' . .. There is no need to apply
the harmless error test or, if the error involves a constitutional right, the
harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt test." 250 Likewise, as to the fair
trial prong of Illinois' plain error test, there is no harmless error
analysis. With respect to the court's responsibility to consider "[p]lain
errors or defects affecting substantial rights" under the second prong of
Illinois' disjunctive test, Justice Ryan stated:
Thus I believe that under this second aspect of the plain error rule, the
errors that will be considered as not having been waived, although not
properly preserved, are those that are so fundamental to the integrity
of the judicial process that they cannot be waived or forfeited by the
failure to raise them in the trial court. I also believe that, being so
fundamental to the integrity of the judicial process, they must be
considered by the court regardless of the guilt of the defendant and
therefore the harmless error test, even harmless error beyond a
reasonable doubt, is not relevant.2
51
Both of these principles were reaffirmed in Herron. With respect to
the closely balanced evidence prong, the court explicitly rejected the
State's argument that the defendant had to demonstrate actual prejudice:
"The defendant need not prove that the error in the instruction actually
misled the jury."252  Instead, the court made clear that "[i]f the
defendant carries the burden of persuasion and convinces a reviewing
court that there was error and that the evidence was closely balanced,
the case is not cloaked with a presumption of prejudice. The error is
,253
actually prejudicial, not presumptively prejudicial." The court
explained that "[w]hen there is error in a close case, we choose to err on
general waiver rule, it must be plainly apparent from the record that an error affecting substantial
rights was committed." People v. Precup, 382 N.E.2d 227, 231 (Ill. 1978). Errors "affecting
substantial rights" are those that "'reveal breakdowns in the adversary system,' as distinguished
from 'typical trial mistakes."' People v. Keene, 660 N.E.2d 901, 909-10 (111. 1995) (quoting
Wangerin, supra note 6, at 778). Such errors must undermine the fairness of the trial or be
something "fundamental to the integrity of the judicial process." Id. at 910 (quoting Green, 386
N.E.2d at 278 (Ryan, J., specially concurring)).
250. Green, 386 N.E.2d at 277 (Ryan, J., specially concurring).
251. Id. at 278 (emphasis added). More recently, the Illinois Supreme Court, relying
extensively upon Justice Ryan's special concurring opinion in Green, declared that the Court will
act on plain error under the fair trial prong "regardless of the strength of the evidence of
defendant's guilt." People v. Blue, 724 N.E.2d 920, 941 (Ill. 2000).
252. People v. Herron, 830 N.E.2d 467, 483 (Ill. 2005). In Herron, the State contended that
the defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice for purposes of plain-error review because he failed
to demonstrate in what way the jurors in his case were actually misled by the erroneous
identification instruction. Id. at 482-83.
253. Id. (emphasis added).
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the side of fairness, so as not to convict an innocent person. ' '2 4 In other
words, the court refused to engage in a harmless error analysis under the
closely balanced evidence prong. Instead, a defendant need only
demonstrate "that there was error and that the evidence was closely
balanced"; 2 55 he need not demonstrate that the error actually prejudiced
the outcome of the proceedings, which is the hallmark of a harmless
error inquiry.
256
With respect to the fair trial prong, the court pointed out that
"[p]rejudice to the defendant is presumed because of the importance of
the right involved, 'regardless of the strength of the evidence.', 257 This
holding leaves no doubt that harmless error is not a component in the
plain error analysis under Illinois' fair trial prong. Rather, a defendant
need only demonstrate that there was "plain error" and that such error
"challenged the integrity of the judicial process." 258
Another substantive distinction between the federal and state plain
error rules is that the federal test is discretionary, while, at least with
respect to errors falling under the fair trial prong, the state test is
mandatory. 25 9 As explained by the United States Supreme Court, "Rule
52(b) is permissive, not mandatory. If the forfeited [']error['] is 'plain'
and 'affect[s] substantial rights,' the court of appeals has authority to
order correction, but is not required to do so. ' ' 26U If the aforementioned
three conditions of Rule 52(b) are met, the reviewing court may exercise
its discretion to correct the error only if it "seriously affects the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. '" 261
Conversely, despite the language of Illinois' plain error rule
providing that "[pilain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may
be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the trial
court,"26 2 the Illinois Supreme Court pronounced that, in considering
errors pursuant to the fair trial prong, "as guardians of the constitutional
rights and the integrity of the criminal justice system, we must order a
new trial when... we conclude that defendant did not receive a fair
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the federal plain error test).
257. Herron, 830 N.E.2d at 480 (first emphasis added) (quoting People v. Blue, 724 N.E.2d
920, 941 (Il. 2000)).
258. Id. at 479-80.
259. See supra Parts II.A-B (discussing the Illinois and federal plain error tests).
260. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 735 (1993).
261. Id. at 732 (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936)).
262. ILL. SuP. CT. R. 615(a).
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,263trial." Therefore, once a defendant demonstrates that there was a
"plain" "error" that "affect[ed] substantial rights," reversal is
mandated.264 In fact, the same conclusion may be drawn with respect to
the closely balanced evidence prong in light of the court's opinion in
Herron.26 5 Thus, in a case, like Herron, where the defendant persuades
the reviewing court that there was ?lain error and the evidence was
closely balanced, reversal is required.-?66
In addition, the scope of relief granted under the fair trial prong of
Illinois' plain error rule seems to be considerably broader than that
under the federal rule. For example, after applying the fair trial prong,
Illinois courts have ordered reversals in cases involving the right to a
jury trial, serious prosecutorial misconduct, the admission of polygraph
evidence, directing a verdict on lesser-included offenses, and other
errors affecting substantial rights.267  In contrast, under federal
jurisprudence, there is only a limited group of errors that have been
found to be "structural" 268 and, therefore, beyond the scope of harmless
error, and thus federal plain error, review. 26 9  These include the
complete denial of counsel27° and trial before a biased judge.2
71
Finally, in Herron, the court commenced its discussion of the
interrelationship between the federal and state plain error rules by
noting that "[both the texts of the federal and state plain error rules...
are similar."272 Although this observation is correct, it in no way
263. People v. Blue, 724 N.E.2d 920,941 (Ill. 2000) (emphasis added).
264. See People v. Keene, 660 N.E.2d 901, 910 (Ill. 1995) (declaring that "all plain errors are
reversible ones").
265. People v. Herron, 830 N.E.2d 467, 483 (Ill. 2005). "We deal with probabilities, not
certainties; we deal with risks and threats to the defendant's rights. When there is error in a close
case, we choose to err on the side of fairness, so as not to convict an innocent person." Id.
(emphasis added).
266. Id. at 483-84.
267. See supra Part II.A.3.b (discussing Illinois courts' use of the fair trial prong of Rule
615(a)).
268. A "structural" error is defined as a "defect affecting the framework within which the trial
proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself." Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S.
279, 310 (1991).
269. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999); see Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461,
468-69 (1997) (listing a limited class of cases in which structural errors have been found). The
U.S. Supreme Court, however, has stated that "[t]he court of appeals should no doubt correct a
plain forfeited error that causes the conviction or sentencing of an actually innocent defendant."
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993).
270. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 357-58 (1963) (involving deprivation of
counsel).
271. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523, 535 (1927) (involving partial arbitrator who has a
pecuniary interest in the matter).
272. People v. Herron, 830 N.E.2d 467,478 (Ill. 2005).
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implies that the rules are substantively the same. 2 73 First, both prongs
of Illinois' present-day plain error rule were already being defined in
Illinois common law practice prior to the codification in 1946 of Rule
52 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the subsequent
enactment in 1963 of section 121-9(a), the precursor to Rule 615(a).27 4
Second, because Rule 52(b) is a statutory creation of Congress,
"federal courts have no more discretion to disregard the Rule's mandate
than they do to disregard constitutional or statutory provisions." 275 In
direct contrast, the Illinois Constitution provides that the "[g]eneral
administrative and supervisory authority over all courts is vested in the
Supreme Court and shall be exercised... in accordance with its
rules."276 This judicial power encompasses the "application of the law"
and "rulemaking authority."277 Thus, unlike the federal courts, which
are constrained by the dictates of the legislature, the Illinois Supreme
Court has full authority over the interpretation of its own rules.
Third, Illinois courts are under no obligation to grant comity to an
interretation given by the federal courts to the federal plain error
rule.27 8  This is especially so where, as here, the federal test
incorporates a harmless error analysis that would effectively undermine
the ability of the Illinois judiciary to protect "the integrity of the
criminal justice system," regardless of the weight of the evidence
against a particular defendant.2
79
In sum, although there are certain similarities between the federal and
Illinois plain error tests, there are significant, substantive differences
between the two rules. The most important distinction between the two
tests is that the federal plain error rule incorporates a harmless error
analysis whereas Illinois' plain error rule does not. It is this difference
more than any other that permits reviewing courts in Illinois to ensure
that the due process and fair trial rights of criminal defendants are
273. In Durr, the State argued before the Illinois Supreme Court that because section 121-9 of
the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, 111. Rev. Stat. ch. 38 § 121-9(a) (West 1963), the
predecessor of Rule 615(a), contained verbatim the language of Rule 52(a) and (b), Illinois' plain
error rule must incorporate a harmless error analysis. Brief for Appellee at 55-57, People v.
Durr, 830 N.E.2d 527, 527 (111. 2005) (No. 97741).
274. See supra Part II.A.2 (examining the history of Illinois' plain error rule).
275. Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 255 (1988).
276. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 16 (emphasis added).
277. Kunkel v. Walton, 689 N.E.2d 1047, 1051 (Ill. 1997).
278. See People v. McCauley, 645 N.E.2d 923, 935 (Ill. 1994) (noting that "in the context of
deciding State guarantees, Federal authorities are not precedentially controlling").
279. People v. Blue, 724 N.E.2d 920, 941 (I11. 2000). See supra Part II.C (comparing the
Illinois and federal plain error tests); see infra Part IV.B (analyzing the Illinois Supreme Court's
decision in People v. Durr and discussing the importance of maintaining the Illinois rule).
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preserved on appeal.
B. Durr: Demonstrating the Importance of Illinois' Traditional Rule
The distinction between the Illinois and federal plain error rules can
be clearly seen in the divergent rulings in the two appellate court
decisions in People v. Durr,2 80 in which the application of the
respective plain error rules was outcome determinative.
During the first appellate case in the First District, the reviewing
court considered the alleged instructional error, which involved greater-
and lesser-included offenses, under Rule 615(a)'s plain error test.28 1
The First District stated that "the instruction as given effectively denied
the jury the opportunity to acquit defendant of the lesser-included
offenses." 282  The court noted that "the instruction conveyed the
message to the jury that its only duty was to determine whether
defendant was guilty or not guilty of predatory criminal sexual assault
[the greater offense], in effect directing a verdict of guilty on the lesser
included offenses ... ,283 The majority concluded as follows: "We
believe the giving of the non-IPI instruction was an error of such
magnitude that there is substantial risk that defendant was denied a fair
and impartial trial."284 Accordingly, the majority found plain error and
reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. However, one justice
dissented, remarking: "Admittedly, the instructions could have been
confusing. But the defendant made no objection to these instructions. I
believe he forfeited his right to challenge them on appeal. The evidence
against the defendant was strong. Given the severe circumstances of the
case, the jury returned the proper verdicts." 286
Yet following a remand from the Illinois Supreme Court, the same
panel reviewed the identical instructional errors under the federal plain
error rule287 and found that the trial court's altered jury instruction was
280. No. 1-01-1711 (Rule 23 Order) (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. June 25, 2003) (reversing
convictions on three counts of predatory criminal sexual assault and one count of aggravated
kidnapping, and remanding for new trial), vacated for reconsideration, 205 11. 2d 603, 796
N.E.2d 1062 (2003) (supervisory order), after remand, No. 1-01-1711 (Rule 23 Order) (Ill. App.
Ct. 1 st Dist. Dec. 24, 2003).
281. Id. at 12.
282. Id. at 13.
283. Id. at 15.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 17 (Wolfson, J., dissenting).
287. People v. Durr, No. 1-01-1711, at 10-11 (Rule 23 Order) (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. Dec. 24,
2003).
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not plainly erroneous.2 88 The First District found that "defendant has
likewise failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the altered
instruction." 289 The court also held that the instructional error at issue
"did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of
judicial proceedings." 29° Thus, under the federal plain error rule, the
same panel reached the opposite conclusion the majority had reached in
the first appeal, ruling that the trial court's non-IPI instruction "was not
error and that defendant was not deprived of a fair trial.,
291
The conflicting outcomes in the appellate court in Durr depending on
which rule is applied demonstrate how Illinois' plain error rule enables
reviewing courts to protect the integrity of the judicial process for all
defendants, regardless of whether the error at bar prejudiced the
particular defendant. The role of the court as guarantor of constitutional
rights not only ensures a greater uniformity of application but leads to a
recognition of the equality of all accused persons before the law where
errors impugn the fundamental fairness of the penal process.
V. CONCLUSION
The Illinois Supreme Court's decisions in People v. Herron and
People v. Durr will provide important guidance to practitioners in
defining the parameters of Illinois' plain error rule. In addition, the
Court's rejection of the State's request to abrogate Illinois' longstanding
plain error test in favor of the federal test will help to end the confusion
in the appellate courts about which plain error standard to apply.
Moreover, in reaffirming its commitment to Illinois' traditional plain
error formulation, the court has demonstrated not only its independence
but its adherence to the pursuit of substantive justice over the
technicalities of legal procedure.
288. Id. at 11-13.
289. Id. at 14.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 14-15.
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